SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad

SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

SIT Study Abroad

Fall 2015

The History of US-Iran Relations and its Effect on
the JCPOA Negotiations
Chase McCain
SIT Graduate Institute - Study Abroad

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the American Politics Commons, Comparative Politics Commons, International
Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
McCain, Chase, "The History of US-Iran Relations and its Effect on the JCPOA Negotiations" (2015). Independent Study Project (ISP)
Collection. 2241.
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2241

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

The History of US-Iran Relations and its Effect on the JCPOA Negotiations
By Chase McCain
October 22 (Fall, 2015)

McCain 2
Table of Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pre-Revolution History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Post-Revolution History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Obama’s Election

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . 19

Rouhani’s Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Analysis of Current Negotiations

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Abbreviation List

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Abstract
Relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic have ranged from
limited to non-existent over the past 36 years, and have been impeded by threatening
rhetoric and perceived betrayals on both sides. The elections of Barack Obama and
Hassan Rouhani allowed for relations to move forward, but both presidents are hampered
by people within their governments who are unwilling to let go of ingrained threat
perceptions and distrust of the other. Despite these challenges, the P5+1 and Iran
managed to create the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran’s nuclear program,
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which can be used as a starting point for a diplomatic thaw. This paper follows the
history of US-Iran relations, and analyzes how this tumultuous past has affected the P5+1
and Iran’s nuclear negotiations. Both are studied through secondary research as well as
interviews with experts on the Islamic Republic. This paper adds to the body of
knowledge on US-Iran relations, and analyses of the JCPOA.
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Introduction
On October 14, 2015, the Guardian Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran
ratified the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an international deal regulating Iran’s
nuclear program. The United States, one of the signatories of the JCPOA, has had a
tumultuous relationship with Iran that has been well documented over the last seven
decades. While devoid of direct military confrontation, both sides have used harsh and
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condemning rhetoric to express their dislike and distrust of the other. Throughout the
years, real or perceived threat perceptions have accumulated, and the United States and
Iran now find themselves in a state of fundamental distrust. It is impossible, as well as ill
advised, to study the current nuclear negotiations without also studying the relevant
history. This research paper will first address what factors led to this fundamental lack of
trust, and then how it has affected the current nuclear negotiations.
There is a wealth of literature about US-Iran relations over the past century, as
well as Persian history and identity. There is literature addressing events, aggressions,
and mishaps that laid the foundation for the fundamental lack of trust between the two
states. There is little information or literature, however, on how this fundamental lack of
trust has influenced the nuclear negotiations and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
reached by the P5+1 and Iran. This research paper will attempt to bridge that gap, and
contribute to the research on the current Iranian nuclear negotiations by answering the
following question: How was the fundamental lack of trust between the United States and
Iran created, and how has that lack of trust affected the Iranian nuclear negotiations?
Literature Review
Literature review for this paper can be separated into three main sections. For
each category I will review the most relevant piece of literature used in this research
paper. The first section is Persian history and identity, and how anti-imperialism came to
be a foundational aspect of both. British Policy in Persia: 1918-1925 by Houshang
Sabahi focuses on a critical time in the creation of Iran’s anti-imperialist tendencies.
British Policy provides an in-depth study of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the coup of
Reza Khan, and the attitudes of Western hegemons after World War I. Persia is treated
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as a plaything, without regard to its sovereignty or needs, creating a deep mistrust of
foreign imperialist powers that imbeds itself into the collective Iranian identity.
The second section focuses on how the United States and Iran have created such a
deep mistrust of each other. For this section, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the
Islamic Republic by Michael Axworthy is particularly useful and relevant. Axworthy
analyzes the foundations and rationale behind the Islamic Revolution, the reasons for and
aftermath of the Hostage Crisis, and the various Supreme Leaders and Presidents who
have governed the Islamic Republic. To understand the foundations of the Islamic
Republic as well as the foundations for the lack of trust between the United States and
Iran, Revolutionary Iran was exceedingly helpful.
The third section focuses on the Obama and Rouhani administrations, and how
the lack of trust between the two governments has impacted the current negotiations. For
this section, The Iran Deal: Achievement and Starting Point by Marc Finaud allowed for
a reasoned and level-headed look at the negotiations and the motivations behind the
respective governments. While the first two sections of this paper have extensive
literature resources, this last section is where there is a gap in knowledge, which Marc
Finaud’s paper helps to bridge.
There are two main schools of thought on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
between the P5+1 and Iran. There are those who support the deal, who tend to follow a
more constructivist point of view: if you include the Islamic Republic in the international
community, it will be incorporated into the rules and norms that govern other nations, and
will be less likely to promote extremism, violence, and nuclear proliferation. Then there
are those who do not support the deal, who tend to follow a realist perspective: the
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international system is anarchic, and every state acts in its own self-interest. It is in the
self-interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran to possess nuclear capabilities, and the
JCPOA is simply delaying the inevitable.
Research Methodology
How was the fundamental lack of trust between the United States and Iran
created, and how has that lack of trust affected the Iranian nuclear negotiations? To
answer this research question, both secondary and primary sources were used. The major
primary sources were the four interviews conducted, and speeches and statements made
by members of government. Quantitative data collection methods allowed for individual
interviews to anchor the research, acting as a sounding board for ideas, opinions, and
questions, as well as providing unique insight into the topic.
Ethical considerations were reviewed with each interviewee at the beginning of
the meeting, discussing their rights and their wishes for using quotes in the paper.
Because the interviews were conducted with professionals and experts in the field, they
were comfortable with the procedure and were willing to be quoted in the paper.
Interviewees as primary sources were invaluable to the depth of content of this research
paper. Other primary sources, mainly speeches and statements released during the
nuclear negotiations, were used to get an undiluted look at the opinions of government
leaders and officials, rather than an interpretation of their opinions.
Secondary sources were used extensively for the first part of the research paper,
which addresses how the lack of trust between the United States and Iran was created.
For this section I used academic journals such as Middle Eastern Studies, The Indian
Journal of Political Science, and World Policy Journal. In addition to academic journals,
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books such as British Policy in Persia by Houshang Sabahi, Bitter Friends, Bosom
Enemies by Barbara Salvin, and Revolutionary Iran by Michael Axworthy. These books
provided a thorough, in-depth analysis of US-Iran relations and Persian history that can
be difficult to effectively cover in shorter papers or articles. Both academic journals and
books were important secondary sources for this research paper.
Analysis
Pre-Revolution History
To understand Iranian culture and politics, it is necessary to begin more than
2,500 years ago. In 550 B.C., Cyrus the Great began his campaign to dominate the
Fertile Crescent, conquering neighboring kingdoms and achieving an empire that spanned
2,000 miles.1 The ancient Persian Empire built the historic Royal Road across its vast
lands, standardized coinage, invented algebra, and adhered to Zoroastrianism, traces of
which can be found in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam today.2 One thousand years later,
the Muslim conquest swept what is now the Middle East and North Africa. Decades of
struggle against the Muslim conquerors resulted in a compromise: the Persian Empire
would adopt Islam while retaining its Persian language and cultural heritage—a testament
to the strength of Persian identity.3 Today, Iran is one of the few nation-states in the
Middle East with a cohesive cultural identity, a collective heritage and a shared history,
contrary to nation-states like Iraq, Syria, or Jordan, which were created by Western
powers after World War I.

1

Aldrich, Robert. The Age of Empires. New York: Thames & Hudson, 2007. Print.
IBID
3 Yarshater, Ehsan. "Persian Identity in Historical Perspective." Iranian Studies 26.1-2 (1993): n. pag.
JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
2
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The strength of the Persian Empire diminished over the next ten centuries, and by
the 19th century Persia had become a strategic entity for the British and Russian empires.4
At the end of the century, “the north [of Iran] seemed to be irreversibly in Russian
hands,” while Great Britain moved to secure southern Iran for its own interests.5 By
1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention officially divided up Persia into spheres of
influence: Russia in the north, Great Britain in the south, and a buffer zone in the middle
of the country.6 Persian representatives were conspicuously absent during this
convention; a testament to how far Persian power and influence had fallen. The AngloRussian Convention amplified Persia’s anti-imperialist identity.
A few years earlier in 1901, an Australian businessman, William Knox D’Arcy,
was granted an exclusive, sixty-year concession for the exploration, exploitation, and
sales of natural gas and petroleum in Persia by Muzaffar ul-Din Shah.7 After striking oil
in 1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was created. Coinciding with the conversion of
the British navy from steam to petroleum, APOC significantly increased the British
Empire’s stake in Persia.8
As the Persian monarchy granted concessions and bowed to imperialist powers,
there was increasing domestic unrest. Throughout Persian history, weak monarchies ran
the risk of rebellion, and the Qajar dynasty was no different. In 1905, as Great Britain
and Russia competed for power over Persia, Iran’s Constitutional Revolution began.9 By

4

Sabahi, Houshang. British Policy in Persia: 1918-1925. London: Cass, 1990. Print.
IBID
6 IBID
7 Bakhtiari, Samsam. "D'Arcy Concession Centennial." A.M. Oil and Gas (2001): n. pag. ProQuest. Web.
20 Oct. 2015.
8 Sabahi, Houshang. British Policy in Persia: 1918-1925. London: Cass, 1990. Print.
9 Katouzian, Homa. "The Revolution for Law." Middle Eastern Studies 47.5 (2011): n. pag. EBSCOHost.
Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
5
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1906, a constitutional monarchy had been established—the first time in Iranian history
that executive power was defined and limited.10 While these limits were often ignored by
the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties, Persia was no longer an absolute monarchy.
In the aftermath of World War II, as European powers declined and America
became a hegemonic global power, Mohammad Reza Shah, the last Shah of Iran, was
loyal not only to the British government, but also the United States. Over the ensuing
decades the United States developed a close relationship with Mohammad Reza Shah,
providing weapons and protection in return for intelligence and a strong ally in a volatile
region.11 It was during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign that the United States agreed to
assist Iran with the development of its nuclear program by supplying fuel, technology,
and training.12
Believed by most Iranians to be a pawn of the United States government,
Mohammad Reza Shah was unpopular domestically. In 1951 Mohammad Mossadegh,
whose main campaign goal was to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was
elected Prime Minister. After two years of an antagonistic relationship, the Shah
dismissed Mossadegh, which caused widespread demonstrations and protests. Due to
this internal pressure, Mossadegh was reinstated and the Shah fled the country. In 1953,
the United States, worried about the expansion of Soviet power into Iran, aided in a coup
of the democratically elected Mossadegh, reinstating Mohammad Reza Shah.13 Already

10

Katouzian, Homa. "The Revolution for Law." Middle Eastern Studies 47.5 (2011): n. pag. EBSCOHost.
Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
11 Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York: Oxford UP,
2013. Print.
12 “Iran and America: An Intersecting History.” Newsweek 153.22 (2009): 29-52. Academic Search Elite.
Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
13 Zahrani, Mostafa T. “The Coup That Changed The Middle East Mossadeq V. The CIA in Retrospect”.
World Policy Journal 19.2 (2002): 93. Historical Abstracts. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
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unpopular, Mohammad Reza Shah’s legitimacy was irreparably damaged by the coup and
the debt that he owed to the United States, which was now viewed as an actively neoimperialist nation with no respect for Iranian sovereignty.14
In an attempt to bolster his power and legitimacy, the Shah established a brutal
authoritarian rule, banning all forms of opposition.15 In the early 1960’s the Shah began
an aggressive reformation program called the White Revolution, an attempt to Westernize
Iran and bolster its global status.16 He enacted a massive land reform program that
destroyed most of Iran’s large landowners, effectively eliminating Iran’s upper class.17
Women were granted the right to vote, went to schools and college, and began dressing in
Western clothes.18 The Shah invested in infrastructure, hospitals, roads, American
weapons, and opened massive new shopping malls, effectively putting small shopkeepers
and baazaris, “the heart of the cities’ economic systems,” out of work.19
During this time, Imam Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a “powerful dissenting
voice,” capitalizing on “indigenous religious nationalism” that was increasingly powerful
as the Shah continued his attempts to Westernize Iran.20 As Khomeini became more
popular, the Shah, who viewed the Imam as “radical and backward,” called for his exile
in 1964.21

14

Zahrani, Mostafa T. “The Coup That Changed The Middle East Mossadeq V. The CIA in Retrospect”.
World Policy Journal 19.2 (2002): 93. Historical Abstracts. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
15 IBID
16 IBID
17 IBID
18 IBID
19 Baghat, G. "Khomeini: Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran." The Indian Journal of Political
Science 48.1 (1987): 31-41. JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
20 Zahrani, Mostafa T. “The Coup That Changed The Middle East Mossadeq V. The CIA in Retrospect”.
World Policy Journal 19.2 (2002): 93. Historical Abstracts. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
21 IBID
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Because Iran follows the Twelver school of Islam, Imams have a certain level of
inherent authority. Twelver Shi’a Islam believes that, of the twelve Imams who were the
spiritual and political successors to the prophet Mohammad, one has remained in a state
of “noncorporeal existence, expected to return as a Mahdi, or rightly guided one”.22
Iranian Imams derive their power as “deputies of the absent Imam”.23 Imams like
Khomeini, therefore, command a level of authority deeply rooted in Iranian religion and
culture, and have often contested monarchical power when Iran is opened to customs that
are “contrary to Muslim culture and tradition”.24 In an attempt to combat the rising levels
of religious and cultural dissent, the Shah placed heavy censorship on the media and the
powerful clerical class, and his CIA-trained secret police dealt with dissenters swiftly and
violently.25
Post-Revolution History
In 1979, Iran finally erupted in revolution. Every economic class was involved,
from baazaris, who had been put out of work by the Shah’s shopping malls, to the elite
landowning classes, who had lost their wealth during the White Revolution.26 Tired of
being used and controlled by foreign powers, the Islamic Revolution displayed virulently
anti-Western and, more specifically, anti-American tendencies. America had supplied
weapons to the Shah and had trained the SAVAK, the hated Iranian secret police.27 The
chant of “death to America” quickly became a rallying cry for revolutionaries, and was

22

Baghat, G. "Khomeini: Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran." The Indian Journal of Political
Science 48.1 (1987): 31-41. JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
23 IBID
24 IBID
25 IBID
26 IBID
27 Baghat, G. "Khomeini: Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran." The Indian Journal of Political
Science 48.1 (1987): 31-41. JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
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established as a “pillar” of Khomeini’s revolutionary identity.28 Revolutionary
movements are often founded not only in what they stand for, but what they oppose:
Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution were fundamentally anti-American.
Iranians showcased this hatred and distrust by capturing the United States
embassy. The Iranian Hostage Crisis was widely and thoroughly covered by the
American media in its entirety, causing an uproar in the United States and creating an
indelible image of Iran as a backwards, violent, unpredictable regime. The Hostage
Crisis was the American public’s first experience with the fledgling Islamic Republic. It
marked the official termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and its
impact on America’s collective image of Iran cannot be understated. Due to this breach
of international protocol, international support for the Islamic regime plummeted.
In September of 1980, newly elected Saddam Hussein invaded the Iranian
province of Khuzestan in an effort to control the oil rich region and “reassert [Iraq’s]
sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab”, a river forming the natural border between the two
countries, and Iraq’s only access to the Persian Gulf.29 Unannounced and relatively
unexpected, Saddam Hussein’s attack was an attempt to take advantage of Iran’s
transitional, destabilized government in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution.30 Had it
not been for the Hostage Crisis, the international community would not have turned so
firmly against the fledgling Islamic Republic, and left it isolated at the time of the Iraqi
invasion.

28

Emery, Christian. “United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American
Diplomacy.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 24.4 (2013): 619-639. Military & Government Collection.
Web. 20 Oct. 2015.
29 Iran: The Essential Guide to a Country on the Brink. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006. Print.
30 Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York:
Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
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In keeping with Iran’s view of America as a neo-imperialist nation, the Iraqi
invasion was perceived by many Iranians as an American plot to destroy the Islamic
Republic.31 The Iran-Iraq War became known in Iran as the “imposed war,” a war
perpetuated by the “money, equipment, and know-how of the United States”.32 Contrary
to popular opinion, however, the United States did not call for the invasion; in fact many
in Washington were surprised by it.33
In 1984, Iraq began attacks on Iranian oil export terminals and tankers in the
Persian Gulf in an effort to pressure Iran into accepting a ceasefire. The Iranians
retaliated, and the conflict soon became known as the Tanker War. The threat to oil
supply drew international powers into the war. In 1987, the US threw its weight behind
Iraq and began a direct military presence in the Gulf. As the war continued to progress,
the US was no longer a presence in the shadows; it had stepped out and was now a direct
threat to the Islamic Republic. The war was no longer against Iraq, and had not been for
some time. Iran now saw it as a direct war against the United States, which had the force
and might of the international community behind it. In July of 1988, Khomeini and the
Islamic Republic officially accepted UN Resolution 598, a ceasefire agreement between
Iran and Iraq that neither named Iraq as the aggressor nor made either country pay war
reparations.
One year after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini
died. With no equal to fill the shoes of Khomeini’s cult of personality, the Islamic
31

Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York:
Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
32 Blight, James, janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, and John Tirman. Becoming Enemies:
U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.
Print.
33 Crist, David. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran. New
York: Panguin, 2012. Print.
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Republic entered a critical time. Into this gaping void stepped Ayatollah Khamenei,
President of Iran from 1981-1989. In terms of US-Iran relations, Khamenei did not offer
much relief from the anti-America sentiment of the Islamic Republic. He saw rejection
of the Islamic Republic as rejection of Iran’s development, and maintained that the
United States did not accept the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic and aspired to
regime change.34
At the time of Khamenei’s appointment, George H. W. Bush became America’s
41st President. At his 1989 inauguration, George Bush Sr. hinted at improving relations
with Iran, stating that “goodwill begets goodwill”.35 Iran’s pragmatic new President,
Akbar Rafsanjani, responded to this gesture by facilitating the release of American
hostages in Lebanon.36 In the United States, however, Iranian aid with the hostages was
seen as simply “belatedly doing the right thing,” not deserving of any particular thanks,
and Iran’s show of “goodwill” went unreciprocated.37 The Islamic Republic saw this
silence in Washington as betrayal, another example of the United States manipulating
Iran for its own benefit, without regard to Iranian interests.
In 1997, four years after Clinton replaced George H. W. Bush as President of the
United States, Mohammad Khatami was elected President of the Islamic Republic.
Khatami ran on a platform of reform, winning almost 70 percent of the vote, surprising
both the international community and the government of the Islamic Republic. US-Iran
relations entered a hopeful period with Khatami’s election, when during his inauguration

34

Maleki, Abbas. U.S.-Iran Misperceptions. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. Print.
Bush, George H. W. "Inaugural Address." Presidential Inauguration. Washington D.C. 20 Jan. 1989. The
American Presidency Project. Web. 6 Nov. 2015.
36 Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York:
Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
37 IBID
35
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speech he stated that Iran was willing to have “relations with any state which respects our
independence”.38 A year after his election, Khatami did an interview with CNN in which
he expressed regret for the hostage crisis (an unprecedented concession for the Islamic
Republic), and praised American culture and history.39 Khatami expressed interest in
breaking down the “bulky wall of mistrust between [Iran] and the US administration”
through “an exchange of ‘professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and tourists”.40
President Clinton responded enthusiastically to this display of friendship, sending
an American wrestling team to Iran. The Iranian public warmly received the team
members, who were the first official representatives of America in Iran since the hostage
crisis.41 As relations between the two countries improved, Khatami visited the United
States in September of 1998. There finally seemed to be enough momentum for an USIran détente.
Then, in 1999, relations with Iran turned sour again as investigations into the
Khobar Towers bombing progressed. In 1996, a truck bomb had detonated in front of a
housing complex in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Hezbollah, with whom the Islamic
Republic had been affiliated in the past, was thought to be behind the attack.42 Clinton
attempted to capitalize on the improving relationship with Iran, and wrote a letter to
Khatami asking for help with the investigation. Khatami did not reply, and investigations

38

Slavin, Barbara. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies. New York, NY: Griffin, 2009. Print.
IBID
40 IBID
41 IBID
42 IBID
39
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into the terrorist attack stagnated, effectively reversing any diplomatic progress made by
the Clinton administration.43
In 2001, George W. Bush was elected President of the United States. Eight
months later, al-Qaeda, a militant Islamist organization, attacked the World Trade Center.
Because al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization, Shi’a Iran was quickly ruled out as a suspected
affiliate. Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, both Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Khatami condemned the attacks, and
thousands of Iranians took to the streets in solidarity with the United States.44
After the United States invaded Iraq and quickly disposed of Saddam Hussein, the
Islamic Republic grew nervous that the United States still harbored aspirations of regime
change in Iran. In an effort to avoid confrontation with America, Khatami’s government
put together a list of concessions that the Islamic Republic was willing to make, including
ending support for Hezbollah, recognizing Israel, and entering into discussions about
their nuclear program, in exchange for an end to sanctions and a promise not to attempt
regime change.45 The proposal, which was sent to the US via Swiss diplomats in 2003,
came to be known as the Grand Bargain; George W. Bush and his government ignored
it.46 Later, when the US began to falter in Iraq and the hubris from the initial victory
began to fade, ignoring the Grand Bargain came to be seen, rightfully, as a mistake.
In addition to their attempt to compromise with the United States, the Islamic
Republic provided intelligence and military aid in the fight against the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Although both countries had mutual interest in the downfall of the Taliban,
43

Slavin, Barbara. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies. New York, NY: Griffin, 2009. Print.
Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York:
Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
45 IBID
46 IBID
44
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Iran’s government hoped that their aid to the United States would improve US-Iran
relations.47 Instead of receiving thanks for their help, however, Iran was named in
George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address as a part of the “axis of evil,” along
with Iraq and North Korea.48 This was deeply insulting to the Islamic Republic, and, in
addition to the Grand Bargain being ignored, reinforced the perception in Iran that the
United States took what it needed and gave nothing in return.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom began nuclear negotiations with Iran
in 2004, after a resolution between the IAEA and Iran fell through. The negotiations
secured an agreement, but the election of hardline conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
in 2005 placed the negotiations under heavy strain. After it became known that
Ahmadinejad was continuing development of Iran’s nuclear program, the negotiations
were officially halted. Ahmadinejad maintained and acted on his radical views
throughout his presidency, aiding Hezbollah and continuing Iran’s nuclear program.
Relations between Ahmadinejad and the international community, particularly the
administration of George W. Bush, remained in a state of tension and distrust. The
United States officially entered the nuclear negotiations in 2006, but remained on the
periphery and avoided direct contact with the Islamic Republic. Little changed until the
election of Barack Obama in 2008.
The next section of this paper will focus on the Obama and Rouhani
administrations and their actions in the nuclear negotiations. It is essential to understand,
however, the decades of distrust that had been built up before the elections of two
pragmatic leaders who were willing to reengage in diplomatic relations. The collective
47

Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York:
Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
48 IBID
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Persian identity and its anti-imperial sentiments have not faded, but were merely
transferred to the United States as it became a hegemonic world power. The United
States readily contributed to its image as a neo-imperialist nation, supporting the
autocratic Shah, removing Mossadegh, and aiding Saddam Hussein in the “imposed war”.
The United States never acknowledged the aid and rational actions of the Islamic
Republic throughout the years, continuing to lambast them on the international stage as
irrational, violent, religious fanatics.
For Iran’s part, the Hostage Crisis had a deep, lasting impact on American
perception of the Islamic Republic. The government of the Islamic Republic, from
Ayatollah Khomeini to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has used extreme rhetoric against both
America and its strongest ally in the Middle East, Israel. Regardless of whether this
violent rhetoric reflects the ideas of Iranian citizens, it has been combined with Iranian
support for regional terrorist groups like the Lebanese and Saudi Hezbollah, and has
created and maintained an image of Iran as fanatical, destabilizing, and untrustworthy. It
is from these two platforms that Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani began their
diplomatic efforts.
Obama’s Election
In 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States, campaigning
on a platform of change. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had decimated American
image and credibility abroad, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, and
Obama was eager to prove that his administration would not repeat Bush’s mistakes. In
his first year as president, Obama embarked on a tour of the Middle East and North
Africa, attempting to stimulate open dialogue. In a Cairo speech addressed to the Muslim
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world, Obama emphasized the dignity and accomplishments of the Middle East and
North Africa, accomplishments that paved the way for the European enlightenment.49 He
emphasized his personal relationship with Islam, and acknowledged that, while “no
single speech can eradicate years of distrust,” he was anxious to create a new relationship
based on “mutual respect”.50
One of Obama’s main points in the speech was the Iranian nuclear program. He
acknowledged the “tumultuous relationship” shared by the United States and the Islamic
Republic, the coup of Mossadegh and the Iranian Hostage Crisis, and the inescapable fact
that the Islamic Republic defines itself, in part, in opposition to America.51 Obama
became the first American president since 1979 to officially recognize the Islamic
Republic as such, stating his willingness to move forward, and overcome the decades of
mistrust that had built up between the nations.
Obama continued to shift the rhetoric of the United States towards the Islamic
Republic in 2009 with his Nowruz statement. Speaking directly to the Iranian people,
Obama recognized the achievements and historical clout of the Persian Empire, and its
contributions to civilization.52 He cited the respect that the United States has for the
Islamic Republic, and his administration’s commitment to diplomacy.53 True to his
word, the Obama administration began full participation in the nuclear negotiations.
Additionally, the Obama administration moved away from demanding complete cessation
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of uranium enrichment, which was crucial to the success of the negotiations.54 Iran
viewed its right to peaceful nuclear power as inalienable, and was not willing to cease all
enrichment.55
In addition to the Obama administration’s recognition of Iran’s right to uranium
enrichment, secret talks began between the governments of the United States and the
Islamic Republic. Mediated, for the most part, by Oman, the talks began in 2009 with the
Islamic Republic testing Obama’s commitment to diplomacy.56 Among other things, the
Iranian government asked for the release of multiple Iranian prisoners and an increased
number of visas for Iranian students.57 The Obama administration acceded on many
demands, facilitating the release of four prisoners, and doubling the number of Iranian
students in the United States.58 All of these events, however, happened during Obama’s
first term, when Ahmadinejad was still president of Iran, which meant that there was little
change in relations between the two governments.
The importance of Obama’s shift in rhetoric, however, must be understood. In the
history of US-Iran relations there had been little direct confrontation between the two
countries. For the United States there was the Hostage Crisis, and attacks made by an
Iran-affiliated terrorist group on the US embassy and military barracks in Lebanon in
1983. For Iran, there was the coup of Mossadegh in 1953 and the “imposed war” from
1981 to 1989. For the most part, however, threat perceptions of the two governments
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were based in rhetoric and perceived intention. When Obama came to office there were
few concrete measures that he could take to amend relations with Iran—there was no
war, there was no occupation to end. Shifting rhetoric was one of the few and one of the
most effective ways to improve relations with the Islamic Republic. The Obama
administration made it more difficult for the Iranian government to claim that the
American government still aspired to regime change, and had no respect for Iranian
sovereignty. When this argument lost value, Iran was forced to restructure its threat
perception of the United States.
Rouhani’s Election
In 2013 the political situation in Iran shifted with the election of Hassan Rouhani.
The election of Rouhani, who was the only moderate among the six candidates approved
by the Guardian Council, surprised the international community as well as Iranian
citizens, who had expected Khamenei to rig the election in favor of a conservative
candidate.59 Roohollah Shahsavar, an Iranian journalist who was exiled in the aftermath
of the 2009 election, maintained that the controversy around Ahmadinejad’s reelection
may have alerted Khamenei to the dangers of disregarding the wishes of the Iranian
people.60 Dr. Jubin Goodarzi, Associate Professor at Webster University in Geneva,
agreed with this idea, stating that the wish to retain what little amount of legitimacy the
regime still held was more powerful than the need for a conservative president.61

59

Sherrill, Clifton W. "Why Hassan Rouhani Won Iran's 2013 Presidential Election." Middle East Journal
21 (2014): n. pag. EBSCOHost. Web. 23 Oct. 2015.

60

Shahsavar, Roohollah. “Roohollah Shahsavar Interview.” Personal interview. 23 Sept. 2015.

61

Goodarzi, Jubin. "Jubin Goodarzi Interview." Personal interview. 27 Oct. 2015.

McCain 22
Hassan Rouhani campaigned on a platform of reform, promising to work with the
international community to relieve sanctions that were crippling the Iranian economy.62
Rouhani promised to regain Iran’s dignity, which had been deeply diminished by the
unpredictable and irrational Ahmadinejad. A testament for the Iranian people’s yearning
for reform and moderation, Rouhani won the election in a landslide, receiving more than
three times the number of votes than any other candidate.63 Three days after his
inauguration, Rouhani called for the nuclear negotiations to be resumed, and offered to be
more transparent regarding Iran’s nuclear program.64 The Obama administration reacted
enthusiastically, and a phone call between Obama and Rouhani became the first direct
contact between the American and Iranian presidents since the 1979 revolution.65
Analysis of Current Negotiations
The negotiations began again, but Iran’s red line remained the same. Iran refused
to concede to complete cessation of uranium enrichment. Iran’s nuclear program began
under the supervision and guidance of the United States government, but the program
was shut down after the 1979 revolution. The program was resumed in the mid 1980’s
due to the Iran-Iraq War.66 Saddam Hussein was seen as a direct threat to the Islamic
Republic, and Iran wanted to remain a step ahead. Jubin Goodarzi argues that after the
American government toppled the Iraqi regime, the Islamic Republic stopped their
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military nuclear program.67 Goodarzi maintains that many of the inconsistencies and
setbacks in prior negotiations were caused by the Islamic Republic attempting to cover up
their past attempts to achieve a nuclear threshold state, rather than current, on-going
attempts to create a nuclear bomb.68
By 2003 Iran’s nuclear program had been opened up to intense international
scrutiny, their primary security concern, Saddam, had been taken care of, inadvertently,
by the United States, and the Islamic Republic did not want to test the international
community’s willingness to engage in direct military confrontation. For these reasons,
experts such as Dr. Goodarzi believe that the Islamic Republic has ended its military
nuclear program. However, the Islamic Republic has always maintained its right to
peaceful nuclear power. The Iranian government is proud, and unwilling to be treated
differently or talked down to; pursuit of peaceful nuclear power is a right of all Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories, and Iran is not prepared for Western powers to take
away that right. The Obama administration realized this, and moved away from
requesting complete cessation of uranium enrichment. The new red line drawn by the
Americans was Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.69 It was from these two stances that the
governments of the United States and the Islamic Republic attempted to reach a
compromise.
When viewed as a necessary compromise that releases steam from a region in
turmoil, the deal is a successful starting point.70 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of
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Action, concluded in July of 2015, requires the neutralization (dilution) of half of Iran’s
twenty percent enriched uranium, and the cessation of enrichment above five percent.71
There is to be no further development of enrichment plants or the heavy-water reactor at
Arak, no new enrichment locations, no reprocessing or development of a reprocessing
facility, no new centrifuges, and a reduction by two-thirds of its current centrifuges.72
The IAEA is allowed to inspect both declared and undeclared facilities, has access to
Iran’s nuclear supply chain, and all uranium mines and mills.73 The JCPOA features a
detailed and thorough inspection and verification system, due to the history of “cheating,
dissimulation, reneging on past agreements or procrastination by Iran”.74
The United States government estimates that these provisions move Iran’s
breakout timeline—“the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material
for one weapon”—from where it rests now, at two or three months, to one year.75 In
return for these concessions, Iran is receiving sanctions relief. After verifiable proof that
Iran has fulfilled the commitments outlined in the JCPOA, all UN Security Council
resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue will be lifted, as well as nuclear-related sanctions
by the United States and European Union.76 If, at any time, Iran fails to comply with its
commitments, the sanctions can be immediately put back in place. In keeping with the
mistrustful relationship between America and Iran, the United States has taken a hesitant
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approach to relieving sanctions. The United States has kept its trade embargo on Iran, as
well as all sanctions relating to human rights abuses, terrorism, and ballistic missiles.77
Distrust for the Islamic Republic can be clearly seen in the domestic backlash
against the deal in the United States. In arguments against the deal, opponents often used
tired rhetoric, accusing the Islamic Republic of being irrational and untrustworthy. The
argument that we “cannot trust Iran” is a simple attempt at explaining a complex regime:
the Islamic Republic is not crazy or irrational simply because it is different.78 In many
ways, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his fanatical rhetoric was a gift to those who would
call Iran crazy and irrational, but this argument, already weak during Ahmadinejad’s
presidency, does not hold up against Rouhani’s pragmatism.79 In the United States
Senate, a Republican effort to block the deal failed to reach the necessary number of
votes. All 54 Senate Republicans as well as four Democrats voted to block the deal, with
42 Democrats opposing.80
Tired rhetoric aside, Senators in opposition to the deal did voice valid criticism.
Chuck Schumer (D-NY) laid out many of the most compelling reasons in his press
release in August of 2015. The reasons included the 24-hour delay before inspections
(i.e. not anytime, anywhere inspections), the inability of the United States to demand
unilateral sanctions, and money from the sanctions relief potentially going to
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international terrorist organizations.81 Many Senators in opposition believed that the
United States should kill the current deal and start over again, enacting tougher sanctions
and pushing the Islamic Republic to accept more invasive provisions.
Opponents of the deal need to consider, however, the history of US-Iran relations,
and the impact of the United States backing out on the deal. International negotiations on
Iran’s nuclear program began in 2003. The JCPOA, twelve years later, is the first
comprehensive deal struck between Iran and Western powers. The Obama administration
enacted crippling sanctions that helped devalue Iranian currency by 300 percent.82 Iran
was forced to the negotiating table in a way that it previously had not been, but the
continuation and augmentation of sanctions would have been both inhumane and
ineffective.83 As markets and economic relationships develop between Iran, China,
Russia, and India, sanctions become increasingly less effective and the efficacy of future
sanctions, if threatened by countries in the West, could have very little impact on the
Iranian economy, which remains the eighteenth largest in the world even with
international sanctions.84
Aside from the danger of inefficacy, the political implications of backing out on
the deal would have manifold consequences on US-Iran relations. The election of
Rouhani and the negotiations have resulted in the highest, most robust level of
communication between the two governments in the history of the Islamic Republic. If
the United States had backed out on the deal, it would have been another example of the
“Great Satan’s” disregard for Iranian efforts at diplomacy, akin to the Grand Bargain or
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Iran’s aid in the fight against the Taliban. This time, however, the disregard would have
been incredibly public, sending a message of disrespect not only to the Iranian
government but also to the Iranian people. The United States proving its
untrustworthiness, once again, would have strengthened the positions of the most
conservative, hardline parts of the Iranian government, and weakened the legitimacy of
moderates like Rouhani.
Hardline conservatives, most notably Ayatollah Khamenei, have maintained antiAmerican rhetoric throughout the negotiations. The Ayatollah’s Twitter feed was a
stream of anti-American commentary, returning over and over to the dangers of trusting
the United States. Two examples are the Ayatollah’s tweets on October 21, 2015,
including “US deceptive involvement in nuclear talks has been intended to advance their
hostile policies towards Iran” and “POTUS claims in his 2 letters to me that he is not
after regime change in Iran soon proved as a lie with him backing internal
conspiracies”.85 Tweets and rhetoric such as these illustrate a fundamental aspect of the
Iranian regime. Founded in opposition to America, letting go of this fundamental
definition would hurt the regime’s legitimacy. Distrusting America and Western powers
was not a transitional aspect of the Islamic Republic; it was founded in a deep rejection of
imperialism and imposed Western values. As relations between Iran and the United
States move towards normalization, the rhetoric of the Iranian regime will be the hardest
to change.86
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Conclusion
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.87 While
perhaps a hackneyed phrase, George Santayana’s famous quote is an important lesson in
diplomacy. The United States government must remember not only recent events, like
the failure of the Grand Bargain, but ancient history, like Cyrus the Great and the vast
Persian Empire. Iran has a long, venerable history, forming a strong collective identity
and culture. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries cemented a deeply anti-imperialist
sentiment into the Iranian identity, and the United States cannot forget the role that it
played in disrespecting the values and wishes of a sovereign nation.
The neo-imperialism of the United States, combined with a perceived lack of
respect and recognition for the multiple diplomatic endeavors of the Islamic Republic
over the past decades has reinforced the anti-American foundation of the Islamic
Republic’s government. The negotiations were able to succeed in spite of this
fundamental lack of trust, primarily due to the efforts of the Obama administration in
reforming the aggressive rhetoric of previous American presidents.
The United States government has less at stake as relations between the two
countries improve, primarily because none of the legitimacy of the American government
rests in opposition to the Islamic Republic. There has still been, however, a major
backlash against both the negotiations and the JCPOA in the United States. Iran has
behaved questionably in past negotiations, and this has augmented the lack of trust for the
Iranian government in the United States. Senator Chuck Schumer, in his statement about
the JCPOA, said that whether or not one supports or opposes the deal rests almost
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entirely in ones perception of the Iranian government.88 It is understandable that, after 36
years of antagonistic rhetoric and little to no direct communication with the Iranian
government, many perceive it as untrustworthy and thus view the JCPOA as a dangerous
concession.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is not destined for success no matter
what: that is to say, it is vital that the United States government continues to promote
positive relations with the Islamic Republic and hold up its end of the agreement. It is
possible that, with the election of a Republican president, relations with the Islamic
Republic would once again turn sour. The JCPOA is a binding piece of international
legislation, and thus the United States will not be able to back out of the agreement with
the election of a new president. However, because so much of the antagonistic
relationship between the United States and Iran is based in rhetoric, a Republican
president who reverses the positive steps taken by Obama in this regard could do heavy
damage to US-Iran relations.
On the other hand, if relations between the United States and Iran continue in this
positive trajectory, the future is bright. Iran will be reintegrated into the international
community, and will be more subject to international norms and laws. The Iranian
government will be forced, to some extent, to open up, creating an environment where
the Iranian people will be able to thrive and make connections across the world. This
deal could be a starting point for substantial diplomatic relations between the United
States and Iran, but it requires continued effort and cooperation by both governments.
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As of now, there are too many variables to accurately predict the future of USIran relations. As the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action begins to unfold and Iran’s
economy receives relief from international sanctions, continued study will be needed to
understand the effects of both. In such a tumultuous region, the progression of Iran
towards reintegration will have manifold ramifications, the importance of which cannot
be understated. The future of the Islamic Republic must continue to be thoroughly
studied as it unfolds, with a complete and nuanced understanding of the past.
Abbreviation List
APOC: Anglo-Persian Oil Company
JCPOA: Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
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